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Abstract 
From the inception of European integration, a regime trying to regulate and arrange competition as 
much as considered necessary for the benefit of society at large has been one of the core elements of 
the European Union’s legal order. While the European Union has over the past few decades become 
more and more involved in the European space effort, this has so far hardly given rise to fundamen-
tal application of this competition regime to space activities, even if space also in Europe increasingly 
has become commercialized and privatized. The current paper investigates the reasons and rationale 
for this special situation, addressing inter alia the special character of outer space activities and the 




During the last few decades the European Union has become interested in outer space, 
more particularly in the benefits which space activities could bring to the populations and 
economies of its member states.1 Roughly in the same timeframe, the global commerciali-
zation and ensuing privatization of space activities started to take off in earnest, with the 
privatization of the major international satellite operators,2 the take-off of an international 
commercial market for space launch services,3 and the involvement of a few private oper-
ators in the satellite remote sensing sector.4 Noting that the heart of the European Union’s 
legal order concerns the creation of an Internal Market with common external borders con-
stituting a level playing field for private companies—read: the establishment of fair and 
free competition—it may come as a surprise to many that the Union’s involvement with 
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space has not given rise to full-fledged application of its competition regime in the context 
of those space sectors. The current paper investigates the reasons and rationale for this 
special situation. Following a brief reminder of the special nature of the European Union, 
it will then focus on the special character of space activities and the space industry, before 
addressing the more detailed peculiarities of the European “spacescape” which gave rise 
to the current situation. Such peculiarities concern the nature of EU law, the special role of 
the European Space Agency (ESA) as a separate player in that “spacescape,” and the ap-
proach to the regulation of competition in European space activities resulting from these 
two premises. 
 
2. The special nature of the European Union 
 
In the context of the political discourse over the last decades the impression often arises 
that the European Union has become a “super state,” a kind of “United States of Europe” 
which has “demoted” its member states to a status of semiautonomous provinces within 
some kind of large empire. This might perhaps be understandable, given the active role of 
the European Commission as the leading and most visible EU organ supervising the im-
plementation of the EU “project,” the existence of a proper European Parliament discuss-
ing legislation which is applicable EU-wide, and the judgements of a Court of Justice which 
can enforce such legislation against the will of individual member states and/or overriding 
any particular national legislation on the issue.5 
However, as the impending “Brexit” makes all too clear, the Union at the heart is still 
an intergovernmental construct of sovereign states which also retain the ultimate sover-
eign right to step out of that construct. In the last resort, the Union goes back to the three 
founding treaties of the 1950s (including the most important one establishing the European 
Economic Community),6 with the 1992 Treaty on European Union7 finalizing the process 
of merging the three resulting communities in the framework of an all-encompassing Eu-
ropean Union. Many more treaties between the member states both before and after the 
Treaty on European Union added to the ever-increasing integration of the member states, 
but the essence remained that all of the member states at the time of conclusion of such a 
particular treaty had to ratify it before the additional measure of further integration would 
become a matter of law.8 
Not only “Brexit” and the famous Article 50 of the current version of the Treaty on Eu-
ropean Union on the basis of which “Brexit” would take place9 but also the general con-
struct of the Union’s legal framework is clear about this: whatever EU law results from the 
EU administrative machinery, it is ultimately based on competences of EU organs and pro-
cesses involving those organs agreed to by the member states by way of the treaties. 
The legal and legislative competences of the European Commission are thus limited to 
those spelled out by Article 17 of the Consolidated version of the Treaty on European Un-
ion and Articles 244–250 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union,10 to 
which all member states have consented as per their ratification of the relevant treaties. 
Likewise, the competences of the European Parliament and the Court of Justice are con-
fined to those provided by the treaties.11 The competence of the Council of Ministers fi-
nally, representing the individual member states directly, ensures that no EU legislation 
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can get enacted without at least the consent of a majority, usually a qualified majority and 
occasionally even unanimity, of those member states.12 Even where there is, due to margins 
of interpretation or unclarity of certain provisions, room for discussion as to whether the 
EU organs have actually been given the competence to enact EU law (in particular of course 
if against the wishes of one or more specific member states), the default approach is une-
quivocal. As expressed most fundamentally through the three key principles of “confer-
ral,” “subsidiarity,” and “proportionality,” as a baseline it should be assumed that relevant 
issues, scenarios, and developments should be dealt with legally at the national level rather 
than at the EU level.13 Only if specific parameters dictate otherwise, would EU-level juris-
diction come into play. 
In short: whether it concerns space activities or anything else, the EU organs can only 
exercise their competences to enact binding law over and above that of individual member 
states to the extent that the treaties, further law enacted on the basis thereof, and the prin-
ciples of “conferral,” “subsidiarity,” and “proportionality” allow for. This brings us to the 
question what possibilities to exercise jurisdiction with respect to outer space activities in-
dividual states would have to begin with. After all, following the maxim nemo dat quod not 
habet or its more extended continental version nemo plus iuris ad alium transferre potest quam 
ipse habet14 individual states could never provide a joint construct such as the European 
Union with more competences than such states would have themselves pursuant to inter-
national space law. 
 
3. The special character of outer space and space activities 
 
When it comes to states’ legal possibilities (including those of EU member states in view 
of the foregoing) to exercise control over space activities, outer space amounts to what can 
be termed a “global commons”: an area outside of national jurisdiction15 and, contrary to 
the terra nullius which historically could be found on Earth, not susceptible to ever becom-
ing part of national territory.16 
Thus, not being able to exercise territorial jurisdiction over any part of outer space, states 
are basically left with three options to exercise jurisdiction over outer space activities. This 
notably of course concerns space activities by private enterprise, as states are internation-
ally responsible and liable for those pursuant to Articles VI and VII of the Outer Space 
Treaty.17 
First, to the extent that such private space activities are remote-controlled, that is with 
the key actor somewhere on earth, normally territorial jurisdiction can still be applied as it 
were through the backdoor—namely to actors on national territory even if the activities them-
selves take place in outer space.18 The crucial difference is that such an exercise of jurisdiction 
is not “exclusive” in that other states can equally authorize, prohibit, or condition activities 
in the same area of outer space—as long as conducted from their respective territories. 
Many states indeed have enunciated national space laws using territorial jurisdiction in 
the above manner in order to exercise legal control over space activities conducted by pri-
vate operators.19 This applies to all eight EU member states so far having established an 
all-encompassing national space law:20 Sweden,21 Belgium,22 the Netherlands,23 France,24, 
Austria,25 Denmark,26 Finland,27 and the United Kingdom.28 
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Second, states can (continue to) exercise jurisdiction on the basis of the nationality of the 
actors, whether natural or legal persons. While there may be issues with enforcing such 
jurisdiction if such nationals are physically outside of the country, in principle nationality-
based jurisdiction can be exercised vis-à-vis their activities regardless of where they would 
be undertaken. This also applies in outer space, noting again that by definition this does 
not amount to “exclusive” jurisdiction as no particular state could exercise any legal con-
trol over the nationals of other states active in the same area. 
Once again, pursuant to the above many of the states with national space legislation 
have chosen to apply it fundamentally to space activities conducted by their nationals, 
usually in addition to application to those conducted from their territory. Among the EU 
member states, Sweden,29 the United Kingdom,30 France,31 Austria,32 Denmark,33 and Fin-
land34 comprehensively apply their nationality-based jurisdiction as per their respective 
national space laws, whereas Belgium35 and the Netherlands36 allow for such application 
under certain, specifically indicated circumstances. 
Third, following the provisions of Article VIII of the Outer Space Treaty and the Regis-
tration Convention,37 states can exercise quasiterritorial jurisdiction over space objects reg-
istered by them (as well as over “any personnel thereof,”38 which, however, is relevant for 
manned spaceflight only). 
A number of states have more or less explicitly included such a reference to quasiterri-
torial jurisdiction over registered space objects in their national laws, including, as for EU 
member states, Belgium39 and Denmark.40 The other six EU member states discussed here 
(Sweden,41 the United Kingdom,42 the Netherlands,43 France,44 Austria,45 and Finland46) 
have at least provided for national registration of relevant space objects. By that token, the 
exercise of jurisdiction over these space objects (at least potentially) may be presumed, as 
the registration processes as detailed in the legislation provide for considerable detail re-
garding the information to be provided, which would logically also impact the actual grant 
or refusal of a license in the first place. 
Obviously, once more such jurisdiction is not “exclusive” vis-à-vis the area of outer 
space as such, since it does not at all impact the right of other states to prohibit, allow or 
condition their space objects and personnel thereof to be active in outer space. 
Clearly, then, following from the above analysis the collective EU member states could 
transfer the competence to use jurisdiction applicable to space activities conducted from 
the territories of EU member states, and/or conducted by EU nationals (including compa-
nies), and/or involving EU-registered space objects, to the EU institutional machinery—
should they desire to do so. 
 
4. The European Union and space: the baseline legal situation 
 
The first problem with EU jurisdiction over space activities in general, however, is that the 
European Union itself is not a party to the space treaties. As far as the Outer Space Treaty 
is concerned, the most fundamental and comprehensive of the space treaties, this is even 
excluded by the very terms of the Treaty.47 Neither would it make much sense to the extent 
that the Treaty addresses entities actually undertaking space activities, whereas the Union 
has so far refrained from doing that itself.48 
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As for the other space treaties, the Rescue Agreement, the Liability Convention, and the 
Registration Convention do indeed allow the Union in principle to become a quasiparty to 
those conventions as an intergovernmental organization.49 
The European Union, however, has chosen not to opt for such a quasiparty status under 
any of the treaties concerned—which notably also prevents it from becoming a quasistate 
of registry under the Registration Convention so as to allow it to exercise jurisdiction in an 
internationally recognized fashion over space objects to be registered by the Union.50 
As such, this would still allow the Union, once properly authorized under the European 
treaties, to exercise jurisdiction over activities conducted from member-state territory (that 
is: territorial jurisdiction) or by member-state nationals (that is, nationality-based jurisdic-
tion). 
However, this is where the second problem arises, which goes to the heart of the EU 
legal order as established over time by its member states. 
On the one hand, when it comes to competition, free trade, and market issues, the Eu-
ropean treaties clearly provide for an overarching role of the EU institutions. An Internal 
Market has since long been established for the trade in goods51 and services52 (meaning 
obstacles to trade between EU member states such as import and export duties and quota 
have all been completely abolished), and with some caveats also for the free movement of 
capital53 and persons for economic purposes.54 Taxation is increasingly harmonized as be-
tween member states,55 and also when it comes to external trade relations (between one or 
more EU member states on the one hand and one or more non-EU member states on the 
other) individual member states have handed over their erstwhile sovereign competences 
to the EU institutions56—all within the parameters of EU lawmaking sketched earlier. 
Most importantly, within that Internal Market, ensuring free and fair competition (as 
long as the threats thereto are of sufficient size and international impact) is now the pri-
mary domain for the EU institutions, notably the European Commission, to address 
through such mechanisms as the prohibitions on collusive conduct (“cartels”), abuse of 
dominant position (“monopolies”) and state aid.57 
On the other hand, however, this regime, going back all the way to the original EEC 
Treaty of 1957, never was contemplated to be applied in the space sector—which in 1957 
was almost nonexistent in Europe even as to the public sector, whereas a European private 
space sector could be seen to arise at best as early as the 1980s with the first private Euro-
pean space operator SES.58 As a consequence, the European Union only started to pay at-
tention to outer space in a very general sense in that same timeframe.59 It certainly did not 
undertake any initiatives to start using its standard legal and regulatory competences in 
this special realm, riddled with security-related issues from which the Union was sup-
posed to steer clear for a long time.60 
Only when in the late 1990s within Europe the understanding became widespread that 
the potential benefits of space activities for humanity extended far beyond defense and 
science, did the Union seek more legal competences in the space arena—again, within the 
parameters of EU law-making sketched earlier. 
The first—and so far main—result of that process was the enunciation in 1994 of the 
Satellite Directive,61 which had initiated the application of the competition regime to satel-
lite telecommunication services and the consequent development of an Internal Market 
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also in that sector.62 It provided proof among others that for the EU institutions to be legit-
imately entitled to start legislating in an area hitherto essentially untouched by EU law, it 
required a specific process giving rise to specific baseline legislation such as the Satellite 
Directive—in this case explicitly justified by both its international and its increasingly com-
mercial character. 
For other space-related sectors, however, similar developments were not likely to hap-
pen anytime soon, as commercialization and privatization there turned out to be only par-
tial, haphazard, idiosyncratic, and fraught with specific government concerns and inter-
ference. Still, the Union had come to understand that space technology and operations as 
a whole, not just those in the communications realm, would be crucial for Europe’s posi-
tion in the world also in the civil and commercial areas, and was looking to push ahead in 
those other realms as well. 
The current result of this understanding in terms of the law63 is Article 189(2) of the 
Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union. This clause provides that, in order to 
attain the objectives of promoting scientific and technical progress, industrial competitive-
ness, joint initiatives, and support for research and technological development, “the Euro-
pean Parliament and the Council, acting in accordance with the ordinary legislative pro-
cedure, shall establish the necessary measures, which may take the form of a European 
space programme, excluding any harmonisation of the laws and regulations of the Mem-
ber States.”64 
As a result, it may now be safely said that the Union institutions are—at least in princi-
ple—able to assert their jurisdiction in re competition in any field of space activity (not just 
space communications). It was clear that the competition regime had already been harmo-
nized as such for many decades, and none of the national space laws dealt with competi-
tion issues to any appreciable extent, so as to preclude harmonization thereof following 
the last sentence of Article 189(2). 
 
5. The European Union and competition in space: the exceptions 
 
Why then has the European Union, in spite of its competences being generally applicable 
now also beyond the satellite communications sector, so far refrained from applying its 
competition regime to other areas of space activities in view of the undeniable commer-
cialization and privatization thereof? 
There are three main, interconnected reasons for this. 
First, the last sentence of Article 189(2) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European 
Union—“excluding any harmonisation of the laws and regulations of the Member States”—
did throw a bit of a wrench into the system, as it clearly left the competence of individual 
member states to license and supervise any private space activities untouched. Noting that 
some of the national laws did provide for possibilities of public-private partnerships 
broadly speaking (which from an orthodox EU-perspective would qualify as a form of state 
aid, in principle prohibited by EU law) in the context of their licensing regimes,65 accurate, 
transparent, and equal implementation of any EU competence in the realm of competition 
would be considerably compromised, if not in the end impossible to achieve, jeopardizing 
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already the very principle underlying the EU competition regime—an Internal Market on 
equal terms across all of the EU member states. 
Second, it should be noted that while the EU competition regime provides, as indicated, 
for prohibitions of collusive conduct and abuse of dominant positions by companies as 
well as state aid as the major threats from that angle to free and fair competition, it also 
provides for exceptions to the illegitimacy of such activities. 
As for collusive conduct for example, it may be condoned if the conduct “contributes to 
improving the production or distribution of goods or to promoting technical or economic 
progress, while allowing consumers a fair share of the resulting benefit.”66 
And as to state aid, a tool also outlawed in principle by the EU competition regime since 
a level playing field for free and fair competition would be an illusion if some States are 
allowed to support their companies with all sorts of financial aid, it may nevertheless be 
condoned if it concerns, for instance, “aid to promote the execution of an important project 
of common European interest” or “aid to facilitate the development of certain economic 
activities.”67 
Such European flagship projects as Galileo and Copernicus could clearly qualify as “im-
portant project[s] of common interest” and even more easily as “certain economic activi-
ties.” Still, this has never been formally so stated by the EU institutions, which might as 
such leave the question open as to any future reassessment of the situation. 
However, as for Galileo, the earlier of the two flagship projects, it has so far been proven 
impossible to convince the private sector to take any leading role in that respect; the in-
tended privatization of system operation, service provision and system maintenance has 
not materialized.68 As a consequence, the approach not only for Galileo but (so far at least) 
also for Copernicus remains one driven by public institutions, making the potential appli-
cation of competition rules a rather moot question. 
More broadly, it can be said that apart from satellite communications, in Europe no 
space activities as of yet could be operated as “normal” private commercial enterprises. 
In the launch sector, there was only one European commercial launch service provider, 
Arianespace, which moreover, though a private company in law, in fact enjoyed very sub-
stantial support of the European Space Agency and its member states in the R&D as well 
as policy realms.69 
In the satellite remote sensing sector, until the advent of TerraSAR-X there was also only 
one private company fundamentally involved, SpotImage, which moreover more or less 
until now depends also on fundamental support in terms of the space operations from, in 
particular, the French space agency CNES.70 
This is also where the third element in the mix comes in: the unique role of the European 
Space Agency (ESA) in the European “spacescape,” which took care of almost all nonmil-
itary and nonnational space activities other than satellite communications and embodied 
living proof that even in the space manufacturing industry a “normal” commercial market 
environment was largely missing. 
ESA had, ever since its establishment in 1975 by way of the ESA Convention,71 funda-
mentally incorporated the European manufacturing industry in undertaking the space ac-
tivities it was mandated to undertake by its member states. The system used to engage 
such private industries was premised on the concepts of “geographical distribution” and 
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“fair return,” which in their essence amounted to assuring every ESA member state that 
“ideally [it] should see 100 per cent of its committed financial contribution to an ESA pro-
gramme returned to its industry in the form of contracts”72—and in reality should at least 
end up as closely as possible to that ideal. 
There can be no question that this system ensured the interests of ESA member states in 
financially contributing to ESA programs as well as in ESA’s success in general, and thus 
can be deemed crucial for the European role in outer space.73 
However, from the perspective of EU competition law this system could also be judged 
as either veiled collusion between the companies concerned, using their respective mem-
ber states as proxies (“if you convince your government you are not interested in this par-
ticular contract, we will tell our government not to compete with you in respect of that 
other contract”), or as indirect state aid (states using ESA as a conduit to make sure their 
industries receive certain contracts without too much competition)—or even both; which 
would obviously be in principled violation of such provisions as Articles 101 and 107 of 
the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union as discussed above.74 
The EU institutions then were wise enough not to officially challenge “geographical 
distribution” and “fair return,” realizing the importance of having ESA continue its central 
role in enhancing Europe’s efforts and role in outer space. This included also prominently 
the overarching need to allow European industry to compete on a global scale with the 
giant industries of especially the United States, Russia, and China—which called for a huge 
measure of concentration of European industrial efforts with reference to space rather than 
the guarantee of competition within Europe, which might arguably weaken such global 
competitiveness of the European industry. 
It should once more be pointed out, that ESA is legally speaking an organization inde-
pendent of the Union—it is not the EU’s space agency. Even the memberships do not com-
pletely align: eight EU member states are not members of ESA, vice versa two ESA member 
states (Norway and Switzerland) are not members of the Union. 
This also means that the twenty European states members of both organizations, in case 
of an impossibility to comply with the EU legal regime and with the ESA legal regime at 
the same time, would be stuck between a rock and a hard place—the EU institutions could 
not simply overrule any relevant parts of the latter. While a deep politico-legal analysis 
would likely come to the conclusion that such states would in the end have to ensure that 
their obligations under the ESA Convention would be brought in line with those under the 
EU treaties (rather than the other way round), and in the last resort perhaps would have 
been forced to leave ESA,75 in reality those member states have shied away from providing 
the EU institutions with the requisite political support to do so—meaning relevant legisla-
tive initiatives would never have passed the EU Council of Ministers. 
When, in addition, the increased cooperation and coordination in matters of outer space 
between the Union and ESA did not result in any subjugation of the former to the latter,76 
it was clear which way wind was blowing here. Applying EU competition law even merely 
in a formal sense (meaning, for the EU institutions to rubber stamp the ESA processes, 
exercising a so far largely theoretical authority) for the time being would be a bridge too far. 
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6. Concluding remarks 
 
In conclusion, while the European Union following a long and winding road of policy and 
legal initiatives can, at least since the entry into force of the Treaty of Lisbon in 2009, can 
now assert competition jurisdiction in principle in all areas of space activity, and the Euro-
pean Commission could thus take the initiative to prepare for detailed EU-level legislation 
in that respect, it so happened that a few major practical and political factors still stand in 
the way of that actually happening as they still guide or even dictate any formation of EU 
law through the EU machinery. 
Other than for satellite communications, not accidentally the area of space activity 
where ESA’s role ever since the early stage of experimental communication satellites is 
negligible, the various sectors superficially being commercialized and privatized were, in 
reality, far from mature enough to apply any Internal Market principles. 
In launching and satellite remote sensing, at least until recently only one private opera-
tor was engaged in a full-fledged manner, whereas in satellite navigation the Union has so 
far failed to find a private consortium sufficiently interested to buy a place in the drivers’ 
seat of Galileo and any possible plans to adopt a similar approach for Copernicus would 
make little sense ever since. 
ESA’s role itself further compounded the policy problems for the Union in pressing for 
any application of the competition regime in the space sector, most tellingly in the manu-
facturing industry where at least several major consortia could be seen to operate—under 
a regime which was anathema for any true believer in competition. As no subjugation of 
ESA to the Union materialized, reflecting the wishes of ESA member states—which in-
cluded the major EU member states as well—to keep ESA operating more or less as it used 
to for decades, it became clear that there would be little or no political support for any 
Commission legislative initiatives in this area. 
And finally, also the Commission recognized that the overall interest in allowing the 
European space industry to compete on a global scale outweighed any interest in creating 
competition where the natural environment for competition would be largely lacking—as 
duly reflected also in both ESA and EU rules allowing for exceptions to the suspiciousness, 
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Consolidated version of the Treaty on European Union), Lisbon, done 13 December 2007, en-
tered into force 1 December 2009; OJ C 326/13 (2012). Art. 50(1) provides: “Any Member State 
may decide to withdraw from the Union in accordance with its own constitutional require-
ments.” 
10. Treaty establishing the European Community as amended by the Treaty of Lisbon amending 
the Treaty on European Union and the Treaty establishing the European Community (hereafter 
Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union), Lisbon, done 13 December 2007, entered into 
force 1 December 2009; OJ C 326/47 (2012). 
11. This concerns Art. 14, Consolidated version of the Treaty on European Union, and Arts. 223–
234, Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union; respectively Art. 19, Consolidated ver-
sion of the Treaty on European Union, and Arts. 251–281, Treaty on the Functioning of the Eu-
ropean Union. 
12. For the competences of the Council, see Art. 16, Consolidated version of the Treaty on European 
Union, and Arts. 237–243, Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union; Arts. 288, 294, 
Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, provide the key clauses on how EU legisla-
tion, meaning Regulations, Directives and Decisions, can become enacted through a complicated 
interplay of Commission, Council, and Parliament. 
13. See esp. Art. 5, Consolidated version of the Treaty on European Union, and Art. 7, Treaty on the 
Functioning of the European Union. 
14. Literally, these maxims translate as “no one gives what he doesn’t have” respectively “one can-
not transfer more rights than he has.” 
15. See esp. Art. II, Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and 
Use of Outer Space, including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies (hereafter Outer Space 
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Treaty), London/Moscow/Washington, done 27 January 1967, entered into force 10 October 
1967; 610 UNTS 205; TIAS 6347; 18 UST 2410; UKTS 1968 No. 10; Cmnd. 3198; ATS 1967 No. 24; 
6 ILM 386 (1967), which states: “Outer space, including the Moon and other celestial bodies, is 
not subject to national appropriation by claim of sovereignty, by means of use or occupation, or 
by any other means.” See further, e.g., F. G. von der Dunk, International space law, in Handbook 
of Space Law (Ed. F. G. von der Dunk) (2015), 55–60; S. Freeland & R. Jakhu, Article II, in Cologne 
Commentary on Space Law (Eds. S. Hobe, B. Schmidt-Tedd & K. U. Schrogl) Vol. I (2009), 44–63. 
16. It may be noted that the Outer Space Treaty, including this particular fundamental clause, is 
generally considered to reflect customary international law, so that neither denunciation of the 
treaty by existing parties nor refusal to ratify by current nonparties would negate the binding 
nature of this rule. Only a major change of opinion of the overwhelming majority of states, in-
cluding in particular the major spacefaring countries, that this clause is somehow not appropri-
ate and applicable anymore, could (at the earliest in a somewhat further future) change this 
summary conclusion. See on customary international law in outer space, including its relation-
ship to the Outer Space Treaty, already V. S. Vereshchetin & G. M. Danilenko, Custom as a Source 
of International Law of Outer Space, 13 Journal of Space Law (1985), 113–26. 
17. See further von der Dunk, International space law, 50–55, 82–84; M. Gerhard, Article VI, in Co-
logne Commentary on Space Law (Eds. S. Hobe, B. Schmidt-Tedd & K. U. Schrogl) Vol. I (2009), 
esp. 111–120; A. Kerrest de Rozavel & L. J. Smith, Article VII, in Cologne Commentary on Space 
Law (Eds. S. Hobe, B. Schmidt-Tedd & K. U. Schrogl) Vol. I (2009), esp. 129–30, 139. 
18. States can thus use their territorial jurisdiction to determine who can undertake space activities 
on or from its territory and under what circumstances. Obviously, for remote-controlled space 
activities undertaken from the high seas or Antarctica, as “terrestrial global commons,” this op-
tion would not be available. 
19. See, e.g., I. Marboe, National space law, in Handbook of Space Law (Ed. F. G. von der Dunk) (2015), 
133ff.; I. Marboe & F. Hafner, Brief Overview over National Authorization Mechanisms in Im-
plementation of the UN International Space Treaties, in National Space Legislation in Europe (Ed. 
F. G. von der Dunk) (2011), 29–71. 
20. Note that Greece in 2017 apparently also adopted national legislation inter alia addressing the 
licensing of private space operators; see https://www.hellenicparliament.gr/en/Nomothetiko-
Ergo/Psifisthenta-Nomoschedia, under “20/12/2017.” However, no English translation so far has 
been made accessible, so that it cannot be included in the present analysis. 
Note, furthermore, that Germany in 2007 enunciated an act addressing only private satellite 
remote sensing operations (Act Protecting Against the Endangerment of German Security 
Through the Proliferation of High Resolution Aerial Imagery of the Earth (Satellitendatensicher-
heitsgesetz), 23 November 2007, effective 1 December 2007; Federal Gazette (BGBl.) Year 2007 
Part I No. 58, of 28 November 2007), whereas Luxembourg enacted a law addressing only pri-
vate space mining activities (Law on the exploration and utilization of space resources (Loi du 
20 juillet 2017 sur l’exploration et l’utilisation des ressources de l’espace); of 20 July 2017, published 
28 July 2017; http://legilux.public.lu/eli/etat/leg/loi/2017/07/20/a674/jo); those two laws will not 
be discussed presently either. 
21. See Sec. 2, Act on Space Activities (hereafter Swedish Act on Space Activities), 1982: 963, 18 
November 1982; National Space Legislation of the World, Vol. I (2001), at 398; Space Law–Basic Legal 
Documents, E.II.1; 36 Zeitschrift für Luftund Weltraumrecht (1987), 11. 
22. See Art. 2(1), Law on the Activities of Launching, Flight Operations or Guidance of Space Objects 
(hereafter Belgian Space Law), of 17 September 2005 (adopted 28 June 2005); Nationales 
Weltraumrecht/National Space Law (2008), at 183. 
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23. See Sec. 2(1), Law Incorporating Rules Concerning Space Activities and the Establishment of a 
Registry of Space Objects (hereafter Dutch Space Law), 24 January 2007; 80 Staatsblad (2007), at 
1; Nationales Weltraumrecht/National Space Law (2008), at 201. 
24. See Art. 2(1), Law on Space Operations (Loi relative aux opérations spatiales; hereafter French Law 
on Space Operations); Loi n° 2008-518 du 3 juin 2008; unofficial English version 34 Journal of Space 
Law (2008), 453. 
25. See Sec. 1(1(1)), Austrian Federal Law on the Authorisation of Space Activities and the Estab-
lishment of a National Space Registry (Bundesgesetz über die Genehmigung von Weltraumaktivitäten 
und die Einrichtung eines Weltraumregisters (Weltraumgesetz), hereafter Austrian Outer Space Act), 
as adopted by Parliament on 6 December 2011; Federal Law Gazette of 27 December 2011; 61 
Zeitschrift für Luftund Weltraumrecht (2012), 37–42, 56–61. 
26. See Sec. 2(1), Law on activities in outer space (Lov om aktiviteter i det ydre rum) (hereafter Danish 
Law on Activities in Outer Space), passed by Parliament with the third treatment, 3 May 2016; 
Parliament Gazette, 2015–17, No. L 128. 
27. See Sec. 1, Act on space activities (hereafter Finnish Act on Space Activities), 63/2018, of 23 Jan-
uary 2018; http://tem.fi/documents/1410877/3227301/Act+on+Space+Activities/a3f9c6c9-18fd-4504-
8ea9-bff1986fff28/Act+on+Space+Activities.pdf. 
28. See Sec. 1(1), Space Industry Act (hereafter UK Space Industry Act), 15 March 2018, 2018 Chapter 
5; http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2018/5/contents/enacted. 
29. See Sec. 2, Swedish Act on Space Activities. 
30. See Sec. 2, Outer Space Act (hereafter UK Outer Space Act), 18 July 1986, 1986 Chapter 38; Na-
tional Space Legislation of the World, Vol. I (2001), at 293; Space Law—Basic Legal Documents, E.I; 36 
Zeitschrift für Luftund Weltraumrecht (1987), 12. 
31. See Art. 2(2) & (3), French Law on Space Operations. 
32. See Sec. 1(1(3)), Austrian Outer Space Act. 
33. See Sec. 2(2(2)), Danish Law on Activities in Outer Space. 
34. See Sec. 1(2), Finnish Act on Space Activities. 
35. Cf. Art. 2(2), Belgian Space Law. 
36. Cf. Sec. 2(2), Dutch Space Law. 
37. Convention on Registration of Objects Launched into Outer Space (hereafter Registration Con-
vention), New York, done 14 January 1975, entered into force 15 September 1976; 1023 UNTS 15; 
TIAS 8480; 28 UST 695; UKTS 1978 No. 70; Cmnd. 6256; ATS 1986 No. 5; 14 ILM 43 (1975). 
38. Art. VIII, Outer Space Treaty. 
39. See Arts. 2(1), 14, Belgian Space Law. 
40. See Sec. 2(2(1)), Danish Law on Activities in Outer Space. 
41. See Sec. 4, Decree on Space Activities, 1982: 1069; National Space Legislation of the World, Vol. I 
(2001), at 399; Space Law—Basic Legal Documents, E.II.2; 36 Zeitschrift für Luftund Weltraumrecht 
(1987), 11. 
42. See Sec. 7, UK Outer Space Act; Sec. 61, UK Space Industry Act. 
43. See Sec. 11, Dutch Space Law. 
44. See Art. 12, French Law on Space Operations. 
45. See Secs. 9, 10, Austrian Outer Space Act. 
46. See Sec. 6, Finnish Act on Space Activities. 
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47. The Outer Space Treaty allows only states as parties; see esp. Art. XIV. Arts. VI and XIII, more-
over, provide that the international responsibility for space activities conducted by intergovern-
mental organizations ultimately (also) resides with the individual member states who have to 
properly address all complications arising from the involvement of such organizations in this 
regard. 
48. Even the two EU flagship projects, Galileo and Copernicus, are ultimately, as for the actual space 
operations conducted in their framework, directed and guided by the Union rather than that the 
Union itself legally speaking undertakes those operations; see, e.g. von der Dunk, European space 
law, 258–65; as to navigation only also L. J. Smith, Legal aspects of satellite navigation, in Hand-
book of Space Law (Ed. F. G. von der Dunk) (2015), 561–65. 
49. See resp. Art. 6, Agreement on the Rescue of Astronauts, the Return of Astronauts and the Re-
turn of Objects Launched into Outer Space (hereafter Rescue Agreement), London/Moscow/Wash-
ington, done 22 April 1968, entered into force 3 December 1968; 672 UNTS 119; TIAS 6599; 19 
UST 7570; UKTS 1969 No. 56; Cmnd. 3786; ATS 1986 No. 8; 7 ILM 151 (1968); Art. XXII, Conven-
tion on International Liability for Damage Caused by Space Objects (hereafter Liability Conven-
tion), London/Moscow/Washington, done 29 March 1972, entered into force 1 September 1972; 
961 UNTS 187; TIAS 7762; 24 UST 2389; UKTS 1974 No. 16; Cmnd. 5068; ATS 1975 No. 5; 10 ILM 
965 (1971)), and Art. VII, Registration Convention. While following compliance with several 
conditions intergovernmental organizations could thereby enjoy substantive rights and obliga-
tions under the conventions, they cannot enjoy any of the procedural rights or obligations, such 
as pertaining to amendments or withdrawals, so they would qualify as “quasi-parties” to that 
extent. 
50. Apparently, at least part of the reason was that the Union was considered a unique sui generis 
international legal entity not on a par with “normal” intergovernmental organizations. This, 
however, is essentially a political argument; as the above analysis has clearly shown, in spite of 
its many special and partly indeed supranational features the Union at the core is still based 
legally speaking on a series of treaties ratified by each and every one of the member states just 
like any “normal” intergovernmental organization. In that sense, nothing would stand in the 
way of the Union becoming a quasiparty to the three relevant conventions. 
51. See Arts. 28–37, Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union. 
52. See Arts. 56–62, Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union. 
53. See Arts. 63–66, Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union. 
54. See Arts. 45–55, Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union. 
55. See Arts. 110–113, Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union. 
56. Cf., e.g., Arts. 207, 211, 217–218, 352, Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union. 
57. See Arts. 101–109, Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union. 
58. See, e.g., K. Madders, A New Force at a New Frontier (1997), 528–32. 
59. See further von der Dunk, European space law, 244ff. 
60. See for a broader analysis of this issue F. G. von der Dunk, Europe and Security Issues in Space: 
The Institutional Setting, 4 Space and Defense (2010), 71–99. 
61. Commission Directive amending Directive 88/301/EEC and Directive 90/388/EEC in particular 
with regard to satellite communications (hereafter Satellite Directive), 94/46/EC, of 13 October 
1994; OJ L 268/15 (1994). 
62. See further. e.g., von der Dunk, European space law, 246–49. 
63. See for a detailed account S. Hobe et al., A New Chapter for Europe in Space, 54 Zeitschrift für 
Luftund Weltraumrecht (2005), 336–56; F. G. von der Dunk, The EU Space Competence as per the 
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Treaty of Lisbon: Sea Change or Empty Shell?, in Proceedings of the International Institute of Space 
Law 2011 (2012), 382–92. 
64. Art. 189(2), Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union; the objectives referred to are 
spelled out in Art. 189(1). 
65. Cf., e.g., Art. 2(1), Belgian Space Law; Sec. 3(2), Dutch Space Law; Art. 27, French Law on Space 
Operations; Sec. 18, Danish Law on Activities in Outer Space. 
66. Art. 101(3), Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union. 
67. Art. 107(3)(b) resp. (c), Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union. In addition, Art. 
107(3)(e) provides for a general fallback clause referring to “such other categories of aid as may 
be specified by decision of the Council on a proposal from the Commission.” 
68. See, e.g. Smith, 562–65; von der Dunk, European space law, 260–61. 
69. See further von der Dunk, European space law, 228–32; Madders, 235–41, 520–26; G. Laffer-
randerie, European Space Agency (2005), 155ff. 
70. See further Madders, 488–89, 527–28; Tronchetti, 509, 538. Also TerraSAR-X actually is a heavily 
government-sponsored operation through a PPP between the private operator and DLR, the 
German space agency. 
71. Convention for the Establishment of a European Space Agency (hereafter ESA Convention), 
Paris, done 30 May 1975, entered into force 30 October 1980; 1297 UNTS 161; UKTS 1981 No. 30; 
Cmnd. 8200; 14 ILM 864 (1975); Space Law—Basic Legal Documents, C.I.1. 
72. von der Dunk, European space law, 222. The key clauses establishing this system are found in 
Art. VII(1), ESA Convention, and Art. IV, Annex V to the ESA Convention. 
73. See, e.g., Madders, 383ff.; Lafferranderie, 107ff. 
74. See further, e.g., von der Dunk, European space law, 265–67. It should be noted, that also the 
ESA Convention included in its general industrial policy principles the interest in creating and 
maintaining, as possible, a competitive environment in the space industry, but only to the extent 
that would not interfere with for instance the need to “improve world-wide competitiveness of 
European industry”; Art. VII(1)(b), ESA Convention. 
75. Cf. Art. 4(3), Consolidated version of the Treaty on European Union: “The Member States shall 
take any appropriate measure, general or particular, to ensure fulfilment of the obligations aris-
ing out of the Treaties or resulting from the acts of the institutions of the Union. The Member 
States shall facilitate the achievement of the Union’s tasks and refrain from any measure which 
could jeopardise the attainment of the Union’s objectives.” 
76. See also discussion at von der Dunk, European space law, 251–68. 
